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On waging the ideological war: against the hegemony of form  
 
“C’est cette démultiplication de la forme ‘entreprise’ à l’intérieur du corps social qui 
constitue, je crois, l’enjeu de la politique néolibérale. Il s’agit de faire du marché, de la 
concurrence, et par conséquent de l’entreprise, ce qu’on pourrait appeler la puissance 
informante de la société.”  p.154 … “Il s’agit (…) d’obtenir une société indexée non pas sur 
la marchandise et sur l’uniformité de la marchandise, mais sur la multiplicité et la 
différenciation des entreprises.” p.155  




What is the power of ideology? 1 How do intellectual constructs become frameworks 
through which people make sense of the field in which they may act? Can ideology be 
materially inscribed in experience? The importance of the performative force of abstract 
economic models and technical devices (in particular those that sustain various capitalist 
processes) has been increasingly highlighted (Holmes, 2009; Miyazaki, 2006). Moreover, 
scholars have stressed that the power to discipline and constrain livelihood options is linked 
to the forceful expansion and institutionalization of particular knowledge constructs (De 





modern epistemology and its separation of reality and representation, object and subject, 
pointing to the co-development of categories in which distancing and differentiation 
constitute emergent power fields in the process (Mitchell, 2002).  
The point I am interested in is different, however. I want to explore the ground for creating 
possible counter-movements. That is, what kinds of instruments, intellectual models, social 
innovations and other devices are needed to change the present situation into one that 
makes people’s lives better? The moral element here is problematic as it is at once 
unavoidable and questionable, for morality is always tied to a particular idea of the good 
(the good life, the common good), and this in turn results from the general models of the 
world (emergent and instituted cosmogonies), the interactions among its constitutive 
elements (also emergent categories tied to epistemologies), and the power of agents (human 
subjects, assemblages, actants, etc.) to make them seemingly attuned to real life experience 
(hegemony).  In staking my position within this problematic and contested terrain I offer 
this article as  a very preliminary proposition that seeks to rehabilitate the concept of 
ideology as a necessary tool of struggle against present-day capitalism. I set my thoughts on 
the paper as an exercise in clarifying  my own ideas, with the hope that this will contribute 
to the pressing, wider tasks of theory that confront all those engaged in struggles for social 
and economic justice. 
 
The withering of ideology as a useful concept 
In this paper I generally speak of  hegemony when referring to the “dominant ideology” 





addressing the Austrian school’s economic model, which rests on an apparently a-political 
methodology for the elicitation of knowledge, I wish to show the powerful hegemony of 
this formal procedure that has become inscribed in everyday practice. I speak of ideology 
mostly in relation to what has been defined as “oppositional ideology”, a framework 
emerging from and enabling struggle. Following Eagleton (1991) I make a distinction 
between the ontological, the epistemological and the political aspects of ideology. The 
ontological aspect refers to the illusion of reality that an ideology may provide: something 
that appears to exist and does not. The epistemological aspect refers to the truth or 
falsehood between reality and its conscious practical and theoretical understanding. The 
political aspect is a function of struggle, of the intellectual resources that can be produced 
to support the interests of a group or class which are engaged in an actual (structural) 
confrontation. The epistemological and political aspects are the ones relevant for the 
purpose of this paper. The three aspects are difficult to disentangle and often collapse into 
each other in many definitions and I will not develop this further.  
Gramsci speaks of “economism” as a hegemony which produces an understanding of 
reality that is methodologically wrong: the separation of economy-civil society from State-
political society (Gramsci, 1987:160). He notes that trade unionism, although expressing 
the struggles of a subaltern interest group, was nevertheless part of the same hegemonic 
understanding that benefited the bourgeoisie and was embedded in laisser-faire policies. 
Although this “methodological” error (the separation) can remind us of the famous 
disembedding aspect of the economy from society described by Karl Polanyi (1971) for 





forms of struggle that become trapped in the spider webs of what they seek to transform. 
His entire development of the concept of hegemony is an attempt to show the processes 
through which political and economic aspects of society are bound together not in a 
deterministic and automatic manner, but through tactic and strategic activity. His objective 
was to create the conditions of possibility for a complete transformation of the political and 
economic system in the benefit of “the many”. For this to happen people’s life experience 
entrenched in common sense notions of why things were as they were must be transformed 
into a theory, a proper philosophy of praxis that explained what that reality was and how to 
transform its structure in the form of an alternative, and how to achieve it. Only if that 
theory was able to explain reality, and the alternative emerging from it could satisfy a 
majority of people, would it be capable of yielding sufficient power to change things for the 
long-term. Hegemony was produced in the dialectical process involving practical 
knowledge embedded in and emerging from experience, and theoretical knowledge in 
conversation with other explanatory models: this was the philosophy of praxis (Gramsci, 
1987: 333-4).2 
But economism as a hegemony was also a particular kind of ideology, meaning an 
intellectual model that obscured or misrepresented reality. It was therefore an obstacle to 
explaining reality in a way that would express people’s real experiences as well as provide 
a logical framework for their understanding and transformation. Hegemony, however, made 






The line between ideology and hegemony is often fuzzy and seems to hinge on the greater 
or lesser capacity of those that are embedded in it (produce and reproduce it) to be 
conscious of its power dimension. The more conscious we are of the power effects of 
models that support our actions and the more we are able to consider them as constructed 
objects that can be analyzed, the more we can treat them as ideology and begin to challenge 
them. The less conscious we are of the power effects, the more the models have become 
part of our habitus and we lack distance to challenge them as mere intellectual objects. 
Reflexivity appears early on in Marxism, especially related to the need to connect with 
ordinary people's subjective feelings and understandings in order to effectively mobilize 
them  (e.g. Rosa Luxemburg, 1999; Antonio Gramsci, 1987; Raymond Williams, 1989). It 
is also tied to the efforts to include non-proletarian forms of exploitation (such as peasant 
petty commodity production, bonded labour) and oppression (linked to race, gender). Still 
the epistemology of Marxism rests on a modernist idea of science where subject and object 
must be clearly distinguished in the operation of knowledge construction.3  I seek to 
address the power that ordinary human subjects, in concrete historical settings that provide 
particular instruments (material and immaterial), exercise in order to challenge and change 
the dispossessions they experience. Based on my research, I ask what these people do, why 
do they do it and how does it change their lives and expectations. 
I have been involved for over 10 years with a large group of male industrial workers and 
their families in a town in the NW of Spain. The area has been in ongoing restructuring 
since the 1980s and early retirement, lay offs, and long-term unemployment have become 





generations are generally unemployed, have precarious jobs in contract firms or have 
migrated. Historically, labor struggle structured through class-based unions has been 
ubiquitous here, and has yielded what people voice as “conquests” (universal public 
services such as health and education, and political rights through parliamentary 
democracy). Today, the situation is one of generalized uncertainty and hesitant forms of 
resistance. As years have passed I have observed three distinct processes (1) the waning of 
a working class faith in unions and union mobilization, (2) the multiplication of forms of 
activism that target concrete issues, and (3) a creeping hopelessness demobilizing younger 
generations.  
In this context, old-time unionists who have shifted their struggle toward social activism 
tend to analyze situations in terms of local connection with larger processes expressing 
structural logics. Analysis produces the design of a strategy and tactical mobilizations that 
they strive to explain in an endless pedagogy of struggle. Knowledge and theory become 
instruments of change and are understood as stemming from everyday life experience. In 
contrast, younger people –with the exception of a small group of young, unionized 
industrial workers—tend to present the local situation as an aggregate of concrete personal 
experiences. A few build collective supports based on social networks, a practice that they 
sometimes abstract as a theory of solidarity that challenges the state and capitalism by 
opening spaces where alternative provisioning processes put people instead of profit as the 
aim. Their theory is also based on their experience, on political and social mobilizations 





a wide range of perspectives including political economy, political ecology, anarchism, de-
growth, social and solidarity economy, and commoning.  
Both groups stress the need to be aware of and respect the multiple social positioning of 
those that suffer from capitalism. In practice, however, the older group tends to produce a 
coherent model and to design a unified oppositional strategy, while the younger group is 
explicitly unwilling to do so. As a result, the local practice of social activism is a succession 
of short-term targeted actions often subjected to the tensions of endless idiosyncratic 
strategies. Demoralization is recurrent and is expressed in the small numbers and high 
turnover of younger people in activist groups. 
If we factor history in, it is difficult to describe the situation of the present younger 
generation as “worse” than that of their predecessors. Yes, they are massively unemployed 
or in precarious jobs, but “stable” industrial jobs in the 1950s and 1960s in Spain under 
fascism did not provide a much better livelihood. The present day welfare state and 
universal public services, however shrunken, are much better than the previous non-existent 
ones. One major difference is the lack of expectations for a brighter future on the part of  
the younger, better educated generations. Another major difference is their unwillingness to 
produce or adopt a coherent oppositional ideology that could become counter-hegemonic. 
 
The remains of an old debate: The hegemony of form 
With this in mind, I interrogate the fierce criticism and ultimate abandonment of the 
concept of ideology as an instrument for struggle by those who would like to change the 





concept’s validity stems from the unbeknownst domination of a neoliberal conceptual tool-
kit, in particular as it has been instituted by the rise of the Austrian school and its 
hegemony in neoliberal though. This has resulted in (b) an incapacity to imagine an 
alternative project that does not ultimately rest on the basic formal premises of 
neoliberalism: individualism (or singularity), freedom and exchange.  
The Austrian school developed as a coherent ideological model during the 1940s and 1950s 
(Hayek, 1948; for an account of the emergence of the Austrian school see Foucault, 2004) 
and became established as a powerful economic model in the 1990s (Harvey, 2007). Its 
major innovations emerged  from the “Socialist calculation” debate that dated from the 
early 20th century (Hayek, 1938; Lange, 1936, 1937). What was at stake in this apparently 
technical debate was an epistemological issue of import: could society exist as a coherent 
whole and the knowledge about it be gathered and organized to meet a particular end? Or 
was reality an emergent result of the interaction of “dispersed bits of incomplete and 
frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess” (Hayek, 
1948:77), and hence could not be organized to advantage? Although in a first round the 
debate seemed to have been won by the “socialist” camp, in a second round the Austrian 
school imposed its views and eventually became hegemonic. The point I wish to make here 
is that the triumph of the epistemological premise for eliciting knowledge that the Austrian 
school proposed as being the only possible way to capture the reality of imperfect market 
competition has permeated our lives becoming an hegemony of form. 
The debate hinged on how to achieve market coordination.  The “socialist” side maintained 





and efficient allocation) but focused on the problems of calculation and planning.  In 
contrast the Austrian school introduced the discovery of tacit knowledge as key to the 
model of market operation. This important shift from the neoclassical model stemmed from 
the awareness that real market situations were based on imperfect knowledge.4 It then 
assumed that competition was a creative process that elicited knowledge about possible 
demand. Hence, “the problem is how subjective, or tacit, knowledge, necessarily 
fragmented and dispersed, can be socially mobilized” (Adaman & Devine, 1997:59).  
Hayek argued  “that the mobilization and coordination of this incomplete and contradictory 
knowledge occur through the actions of entrepreneurs, competing against one another in the 
market process, discovering and learning what is and is not possible.” (Adaman & Devine, 
1997:59). This creative dynamic not only required entrepreneurship but also a constant 
effort at innovation, that is, of creating difference that would momentarily provide 
monopoly advantage in the market.5 In the 1980s and 1990s scholars in the West (Adaman 
and Devine, 1997; Elson, 1988) attempted to counter the Austrian economic school’s 
expanding hegemony in a context of increasing hardship of the population subject to 
structural adjustment programs. They revisited the parameters of the original debate about 
market coordination in socialism in an attempt to reconfigure them while vindicating their 
worth for a new socialist project.6 
The Austrian school’s underlying assumptions about the form of eliciting knowledge from 
discrete and dispersed social agents, which was the crux of that debate, are in my opinion 
similar to contemporary efforts to theorize an alternative to capitalism that would support a 





assumption about how to elicit tacit knowledge through exchange, a process that will be 
then expressed in prices which will guide further action, this model contains some formal 
significant parallels with certain practices of present day (de)mobilizations and the critical 
theories that sustain them. 
The basic premise of the Austrian school is the existence of dispersed (independent and 
autonomous) individuals possessing largely “tacit” knowledge (i.e. pre-conscious or 
unconscious knowledge) (M. Polanyi, 1967). It is this methodological (formal) premise 
which, I suggest, is enacted7 by present-day anti-capitalist and social justice mobilizations 
and may be at the source of their incapacity to produce a coherent and robust counter-
hegemony. The emergent aspect of knowledge about the world that results from free market 
interaction and supports the economic model appears to me similar in its form to post-
structuralist epistemological and political models such as the “sociology of emergences” 
(Santos, 2004a) or the virtual “constituent power” of a multitude of desiring subjectivities 
(Negri, 2009). While this anti-authoritarian view of the world is extremely attractive to 
radical activism it seems to lack the capacity to become counter-hegemonic precisely 
because it is based on a form that is like the one that supports the system it seeks to 
transcend. I am not saying that this is an intentional or even conscious move, on the 
contrary, in my opinion it expresses the hegemony of form. Indeed, in the post-structuralist 
mobilization / activism theories, the political project is created through a process of 
permanent discovery as a result of the free interaction of subjectivities, knowledges, and 
world(view)s.8 The creative, innovative and democratic aspect of this emergent politics is 





this new form of politics is premised on eliciting difference as opposed to the “enlightened” 
aim of eliciting equality, a shift that parallels the move from neoclassical to Austrian 
models of the economy.  
The shift is subtle but can be found in the premise that the forces of political change should 
arise from autonomous –equal but essentially different— entities or “singularities” (be it 
individuals or quasi-corporate groups such as “communities”) that, to push the metaphor 
further, could be described as adopting an “enterprise form” (Foucault, 2004:154) and 
interacting in a “market-like” arena (e.g. a “forum”) where they create social value. 
However, in these oppositional political models cooperation rather than competition is the 
relationship that produces social value in the exchange arena and this is a major difference. 
To use Lazaratto’s words, common goods emerge “as a result of co-creation and co-
realization of the cooperation of ordinary subjectivities”  in the event-driven arena 
(Lazaratto, 2006:129). These new models eschew the old revolutionary ideologies that were 
premised on designing a whole (brave) new world on the basis of understanding existing 
relations as a connected totality that needed to be challenged in its entirety.  According to 
Santos (2003a: 243). “There is no unique theory to guide the movements, because the aim 
is not so much to seize power but rather to change the many faces of power as they present 
themselves in the institutions and sociabilities. At this level, the novelty consists in the 
celebration of diversity and pluralism, experimentalism, and radical democracy.”  These 
movements are understood as able to open up spaces where the plural visions of alternative 





challenge in myriad ways the hegemony of capitalism and provide content for the critical 
theorization of political struggle.  
While these oppositional movements are undoubtedly a form of struggle, which produces 
results and unleashes counter-hegemonic forces, I suggest that their fragmented expression 
(in practice and theory) and their unwillingness to unify the struggle around an ideological 
project blocks their ability to overhaul our globalized society. Why is this so? My 
hypothesis is that the event-driven pluralistic political model while considered 
revolutionary by its promoters may be the paradoxical expression of a hegemonic 
neoliberal “power informing society”, the power of form (Foucault, 2004:154).  
In an illuminating passage, Terry Eagleton (1991:85-86) analyzes the contribution of 
Marx’s commodity fetishism theory for the thinking of ideology, here understood as 
deceptive beliefs. In his view, commodity fetishism shifts our understanding of ideology 
from the discursive constructions of a particular class to the material structure of society as 
a whole. Collective social relations appear as relations between discrete things that exercise 
power over actual human relations. Hence “mystification, so to speak, is an ‘objective’ fact 
embedded in the very character of the system: there is an unavoidable structural 
contradiction between that system’s real contents, and the phenomenal forms in which 
those contents proffer spontaneously to the mind.” (Eagleton, 1991:86) This insight can be 
usefully extended to the new forms of political struggle. The ‘phenomenal forms’ of 
struggle (discrete challenges guided by emergent fragmented knowledge) are a result of the 
present-day ‘character of the system’ but contradict ‘that system’s real contents’ (the 





Indeed, what strikes me as particularly relevant is the historical conjuncture of emergence 
of contemporary social movements and post-structural political theory in a context where 
the Austrian neoliberal model of the economy is hegemonic and where the transformations 
that it has brought about in the everyday practice of contemporary capitalism are dissolving 
the experience of a collective working-class agent. I turn now to the ethnography. 
 
Ethnographic intelligence: What we learn from the field 
In order to illuminate this issue further I try to pay attention to what some people who self-
identify as being “injured” by capitalism but who do not define themselves as “activist” say 
about what matters to them in the present conjuncture of structural adjustment. When 
listening to narratives of their lives in this NW corner of Spain, five aspects are recurrently 
highlighted, each of which points to conflicts that express their relationship with the 
system.  
(1) The centrality of care. People talk about giving and receiving care both in its material 
and emotional forms. Care is not just a mutual claim that individuals address to each other; 
it is also a claim on the collective, the family, the community and the state (or other 
powerful institutions such as the Church). But this caring activity is fraught with 
misunderstanding and conflict. Generally the conflict stems around the understandings and 
tensions of dependence and autonomy that interdependent people try to negotiate. 
(2) The importance of doing. People stress that they need to “work”, not only because it is a 
way of providing an income and hence a means of livelihood, but very centrally because it 





effort entails, is better than its absence. However, work in this context  is fraught with 
conflict because it simultaneously produces feelings of autonomy, heteronomy and 
dependence. These conflicting feelings about work express the need to preserve the mind-
body from breaking down under the joint, albeit dissimilar forces of productivity pressures, 
patronage requests and solidarity claims. 
(3) The capacity to have a long-term life project. Young people want to have the possibility 
of designing a path into their individual future including a career, getting married, raising 
children, and buying a home. This is a will to control their destiny and the choices they 
make to fulfill their desires. Their expectations should become part of a “plan” that would 
become a guideline to follow or a possibility towards which to aspire (Bourdieu, 2003; 
Narotzky and Besnier, 2014). Social projects aiming at forging a better world are framed as 
immediate struggles targeting concrete livelihood issues such as food and housing, and 
resting on an appeal to solidarity that fosters mutual help while enhancing self worth. The 
conflict young people experience in this domain stems from the implosion of the 
environment of expectations, that is, the grid of interdependent processes that they had 
imagined as relatively secure. Instead they face the injunction to permanently “re-invent” 
themselves, something they understand as a symptom of their loss of the opportunity to 
construct a long-term life project. They resent this entrepreneurial metaphor of the self  as a 
heteronomous imposition although they sometimes define it as a liberating practice. 
(4) The claim to recognition. People speak of “dignity”, and feel deprived of it in the 
present even as they vindicate it as a “conquest” of the struggles of their working parents. 





with nominal equal rights but also with claims to equalization processes through state 
redistribution. To claim dignity is to be part of something larger and beyond oneself and to 
have a position that is recognized as meaningful in this wider system. Recognition is a 
political aim that gathers its meaning from an idea of society as an existing entity, one were 
people as individuals hold a valued place as members of an interdependent whole. It is the 
means to acquire personal worth, while simultaneously creating worth for the collective. 
Conflict here emerges from the fact that people (in particular younger generations) are not 
given a meaningful space within their society and that they are pushed to feel  socially 
redundant (Smith, 2011; Li, 2009; Ferguson, 2013).  
(5) The requirement of responsibility. Like the previous claim, this one stems from the need 
to understand individual action as a process linked to other people’s wellbeing. It is a 
socially grounded claim to have people (as individuals or as institutions) be responsible for 
their actions. There is an individual aspect as people point to concrete agents as responsible 
for a particular harmful deed, and there is also a claim to a wider institutional responsibility 
(often personified) for actions that harm the collectivity. This responsibility is voiced in 
either very specific terms (moral responsibility of parents to care for their children or vice 
versa) or in very abstract terms (failed responsibility of the system, capitalists, banks, the 
state, etc.) Conflict arises in the tension between being identified as responsible for 
particular misdeeds by others (e.g. banks pushing subprime mortgage responsibility on 
irresponsible client’s actions or on financial illiteracy) and, simultaneously, demanding 
responsibility from particular or institutional others (e.g. corruption). Responsible practices 





reality that is imagined as a meaningful entity (e.g. “having a life”), is based on the 
existence of specific instances of co-operation that are instituted through an understanding 
of mutual obligation. 
The conflicts that emerge from these five considerations of what really matters for having a 
life worth living are expressed in struggles to make it happen. Sometimes the struggles take 
the form of individual strategies seeking the support of kinship networks, yet often they 
appear as organized collective mobilizations under the banner of solidarity. Mostly, 
however, these struggles are discrete and unconnected reactions to the attacks of structural 
adjustment on people’s livelihood resources and expectations. If we think of ideologies as a 
function of struggle, as the intellectual weapons of class struggle (Eagleton, 1991:90), the 
inability to create a coherent ideology that would support a unified project of social 
transformation becomes a serious handicap. 
With present deepening of structural adjustment policies in the Western centers and semi-
peripheries, structural unemployment expands while stable employment is replaced by 
temporary, precarious, often informal work. As a result the “working poor” category 
becomes ubiquitous and the distinction between “formal” and “informal” work is 
increasingly meaningless for people who go from one to the other recurrently, or hold jobs 
that can be described as one or the other. Moreover, the expansion of people who are non-
waged and self-employed and of micro-firms (of two or three personally acquainted 
“entrepreneurs” trying to put together an income generating activity) often in the grey 
zones of subcontracting or service provision, has completely changed the expectations of a 





Many do not have “expectations” at all and enact a picaresque of day-to-day tactical 
maneuvers to make ends meet. In order to access needed resources others activate family 
networks or claim subsidies from the state, in each case asking that these actors  take on the 
responsibilities of care. Yet others attempt to make good within the “entrepreneurial” 
model that is endorsed by the dominant discourse. As petty entrepreneurs or self-employed 
suppliers they confront an unfavorable credit and tax context that impairs their competitive 
position, and drives them to “self-exploitation”. Finally some people choose movement and 
migrate, in the hope of finding work abroad and a better life (Pine, 2014).  
This situation has produced a welfare paradox that has reconfigured the meanings of 
solidarity. Indeed, while corporate welfare becomes an entrenched policy (favored by 
national and supra-national bodies alike), social welfare, in addition to being cut, has been 
demonized as creating dependency and obstructing individual initiative. But at the same 
time, European neoliberal states praise forms of “community” solidarity and family 
dependencies as being better forms of social support and responding to immediate forms of 
care obligation (e.g. family), that should not be transferred to the state (Collins and Mayer, 
2010; Pitrou, 2003; Thelen, 2015). The family and community “safety-net” which in 
Europe was the Mediterranean social welfare model attributed to Southern countries (Spain, 
Italy, Greece, Portugal) has increasingly been defended as a convenient complement to the 
neoliberal rolling-back of the state for northern countries as well (e.g. Netherlands, UK) 
(Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012; Meyer, 2014; Jacobs and Manzi, 2013). 
What theoretical frameworks do people produce to explain these experiences and guide 





market and the state have become irresponsible in terms of  providing the means for a 
decent livelihood. The market does not provide jobs or sufficient income to live on, and the 
state is rolling back and privatizing basic services such as education, health, retirement 
pensions and social housing while increasing the pressure of taxation on ordinary people. 
People are made to feel redundant socially, something that they express as a loss of   
dignity, and of their place in society. Their only value for the state seems to be as fiscal 
cash-cows to be milked through indirect taxation. Feeling useless while feeling over-taxed 
and under-serviced are paradoxical understandings of their social position as citizens. These 
are emotional expressions of being pushed away while being taken advantage of.   
In this predicament people look for support elsewhere and turn to personal networks of 
solidarity, primarily based on the immediate family or charitable, religious and mutual help 
associations (Muehlebach 2012). At the same time these solidarities are the only 
relationships that carve a new meaningful social space, although one with ambiguous 
interpretations and strong emotional contradictions (as when adult children with their 
families take refuge in their retired parent’s home, becoming what one parent described as 
“internal refugees”).  
In the social mobilizations and organized movements that have emerged since 2008, 
autonomy, dependency and solidarity are often used to explain the changes in the 
interdependent positions of individuals, but contradiction pervades these concepts. 
Although autonomy is seen in a positive light, following liberal understandings of personal 
freedom and control of the self, the state’s “abandonment”  of its responsibilities  exposes 





autonomy, which has been forcefully imposed on them. This abandonment is explicitly 
resented in relation to austerity cuts to health and education and to the blatant lack of 
protection of citizens deprived of housing through foreclosures.  
Dependency on state subsidies is generally perceived as demeaning even when needed, but 
not all forms of dependence on the state are condemned. Universal social provisioning of 
public services such as health and education is not conceived as dependency but as a 
“right” attached to citizenship, and thus to political belonging. Finally, mutual help from 
voluntary association is understood as a positive form of dependency that contributes to 
asserting personal dignity, while charity help, on the contrary, is conceived as shameful and 
humiliating.  
Solidarity also is variously described, often with overlapping meanings and affects 
attached. Generally speaking solidarity that is the result of individual “voluntary” 
association as in co-operatives, time banks, Local Exchange Trading Systems and other 
social economy entities is explicitly differentiated from “forced” solidarity. This later form 
of solidarity results from the replacement of state services with goods or services provided 
by charitable entities or with the help received from the family, described as “natural”, 
despite the fact that kin support often produces extremely ambivalent and conflictive 
reactions (Thelen, 2015). Finally, yet another meaning of solidarity refers to collective 
mobilizations demanding changes in the present day political economic situation, focusing 
primarily on the demand for “food, jobs, housing and dignity” (Narotzky, 2016). For those 
older generations who were active in labor and anti-fascist struggles before the 1980s and 





understood as the making of an organized force of people in objectively similar structural 
positions, something they described as “the world of work” (rather than as a “class”) 
incorporating in this category a wide inventory of social positions (including petty 
entrepreneurs) as long as they have been “injured by capitalism” (Narotzky, 2015). 
In this part of the world, the tensions between the positive and negative aspects of 
dependence, autonomy and solidarity are based on the idealized equality and autonomy of a 
liberal enlightenment belief that everyday experience denies them in practice.  People look 
for a job that will provide sufficient income to live with dignity, meaning by it, with a basic 
autonomy and, with it, the ability to voluntarily choose his or her (inter)dependent9 
relationships  (e.g. with family, interest groups, etc.). While dependency might be 
welcomed as a means of producing belonging and personhood, it is always premised on a 
romanticized position of individual “equality”, leading to “freedom of choice”. This, for 
them, is what creates the conditions of possibility for “having a life”, where mutual 
dependency becomes social inter-dependency, changing the value of dependency from 
negative to positive. 
In this situation, practical consciousness expresses the material conditions and tensions in 
which people have to make a living. While, on the one hand, they aspire to retain enough 
autonomy to feel they have a “choice” (in the liberal sense) as manifest through income 
stability and consumption practices; on the other, they are forced to enter into various forms 
of dependency relations not of their own choice. In this conjuncture, solidarity seems to 
become for them a mediating ideology that can resolve the tension between the two. It 






Is a return to oppositional ideology possible? Is it desirable? 
In a recent conversation with one of my favourite interlocutors in the field, Ramon, an old 
time union leader who has been involved for the last 20 years in social activism outside the 
union, I was surprised by his strong attack on what he defined as “ideology”. In support of 
the new political party Podemos which decries the outmoded division between Left and 
Right, this former communist said: “We need to go beyond the ideological debate that has 
been co-opted by the old parties. The debate between Left and Right is an ideological 
debate, a symbolic debate, but interests go beyond ideology. We need to get to the 
grassroots, look into the problems that affect the people.” He described this need to go 
beyond “ideology” as a “tactical” movement that would produce a social force out of all 
those that were being injured by capitalism, a collective that he did not define as a “class” . 
This social force included small entrepreneurs suffering from the credit crunch, overtaxed 
self-employed workers, as well as unemployed people and mortgage holders suffering from 
foreclosures. Class in his view was a concept restricted to employed wage labour, and only 
made sense within strict trade union mobilizations. 
For Ramon, the injuries of capitalism were closely connected to the new material 
conditions that neoliberal deregulation, financial capitalism and austerity cuts had brought 
about after the 2008 crisis. And the injuries of capitalism became something different from 
the injuries of class. Coming from someone that I have long admired as an exceptional 
political analyst, a socialist who had been trained in a pragmatic Marxist tradition I could 





What was so negative about embracing an ideology? Could the term still hold a positive 
value as an instrument of class struggle? How can we struggle against hegemony without 
some kind of unified ideological framework? 
In another conversation, a retired industrial worker, Juan, who is also now a social activist, 
reflected on the difficulties of collective mobilization in the present. He had been actively 
involved in a social movement—the “Dignity Marches”—that emerged in 2014 in Spain in 
the wake of anti-austerity mobilizations primarily against public service cuts in the 
education and health systems (Narotzky, 2016). These marches were organized by civil 
society associations and some alternative unions and seemed to express a new kind of 
confluence of injured people. Most participants came from what could be defined as the 
lower echelons of a classic “working class” (mostly unemployed and precarious workers 
and their families). This “Dignity Marches” movement organized a march to Madrid (22 
March 2014, 22-M) that brought approximately one million people from all over Spain 
claiming for “Pan, trabajo, techo y dignidad” (Bread, work, a roof and dignity).  
Juan’s friend, Marcos, still employed and a committee member of the large Comisiones 
Obreras [CCOO] (Workers’ Commissions) trade union in the local shipyard, countered that 
the Marches were a movement of the “lumpen”, by which he meant people who are not 
“formed” who “do not possess a framing discourse that enables them to analyze the issues 
at stake”. He recognized nevertheless that the mobilizing initiative that used to be in the 
union’s hands now was in the hands of “civil society.” The unions, he said, used to be an 
instrument for the articulation of struggle that had almost disappeared due to the co-





thinking they were not “working class” but “middle class”. As he explained it, during the 
resistance to the Franco dictatorship, unions articulated a wider political and social class 
struggle that went far beyond trade issues; they were, then, the backbone of civil society 
instead of the self-centered interest group they now had become (Narotzky, 2014, 2015). 
Juan was dismayed because the impetus that mobilized people in the 22-M 2014 marches 
had disappeared. In September of 2015 I attended a small local meeting of the activists that 
organize the Marches where the objective of the movement was spelled out clearly: to unify 
different struggles. However, the practical results were virtually nonexistent: people did not 
respond to the organizers’ calls to demonstrate in solidarity with other mobilizations. There 
were many small, targeted demonstrations everyday but no unifying solidarity across them. 
This small group saw their work as showing their support to all the different mobilizations 
–by being physically present—, and informing the participants about the unifying role of 
the “Marches”. They stressed the need to “be in the street” and to “be encouraging” 
although in the meeting everyone saw the situation as pretty bleak. 
In order to think about the practice of contemporary collective struggle I will address the 
concept of solidarity which pervades the discourse of the people struggling to make a living 
and to respond to the injuries of capitalism. Is a theory of solidarity a new oppositional 
ideology? Solidarity is a concept that emerged in the 19th century in France and had 
expanded into other areas of Europe and America by the end of the century. By the turn of 
the twentieth century three versions of the concept were fairly well established: labour 
solidarity (constructing class unity in order to confront the bourgeoisie), social solidarity 





solidarity (creating harmony among hierarchically differentiated social groups) (Blais, 
2007). Many of the classical anthropological works (e.g. Durkheim, Mauss, and 
Malinowski) are directly or indirectly involved in this debate which I have addressed 
elsewhere (Narotzky, 2007).  
In the historical debate the main questions addressed by proponents of all three perspectives 
were:  determination vs. free will with regard to human action;  society vs. the individual as 
the original component of humanity;  equality vs. inequality in human relations and;  the 
process that could configure the common good and therefore justice. These dialectical 
confrontations were part of often violent political struggles that claimed public legitimacy 
in terms of ideas about humanity, society, liberty, interdependence and a “higher good” to 
be accomplished in the future through political action. This debate was inscribed in the 
tension between Enlightenment and Modernity ideologies and Traditionalist and Catholic 
ones (Blais, 2007). I would argue that the issues that were at stake have not disappeared or 
even changed much, and reading Marx’s historical writings is very enlightening in this 
regard. Today, however, one of the theoretical positions in the debate has been able to 
incorporate its premises of singularity and exchange as a hegemony of form. Indeed,  
localized struggles against the uneven but connected expressions of capitalism appear as 
singular manifestations whose political value emerges in the global forum (the arena of 
exchange). The force of hegemony is in the form that mystifies real content.  
If the debate about the ambiguous concept of solidarity has waned it is not because, now as 
before, people attribute different meanings to the concept, but because there is no 





provide a coherent model for social transformation. David Featherstone defines solidarity 
as a “relation forged through political struggle that seeks to challenge forms of oppression” 
(2012:5) Solidarities have also been described as “constructed through processes of 
relationality, connectivity and commonality between diverse place-based struggles” 
(Chatterton et al., 2013: 613). These understandings are based in the analysis of local 
struggles against particular expressions of capitalist oppression that connect with similar 
oppositional mobilizations across borders enabling the construction of trans-local “shared 
maps of grievances” across cultural and historical differences (Chatterton et al., 2013:614). 
However, analysts acknowledge the disabling long-term effect of different class positions, 
political allegiances, strategies and tactics that exists within the various groups that 
converge in concrete solidarity mobilizations. Admittedly, overcoming this would entail a 
broader political discussion (Borras, 2008, Chatterton et al., 2013) that would build an 
argument for the unification of struggles as a transformative project of the entire system. At 
the same time Andrea Muehlebach (2012) explores the connection between practices of 
solidarity and the neoliberal state, and highlights the ambiguous nature of the concept as it 
produces “moral neoliberal” subjectivities through “practices that are both oppositional and 
complicit at the same time” (2012:9) 
But what kind of relation is “solidarity”? As a practice, solidarity is a coming together but 
the motives and objectives of this process can have multiple political implications. In 
particular the divergent meanings that emerged at the turn of the 20th century are all still 
present: solidarity as (1) corporative togetherness (religious, ethnic, nationalistic 





mobilization in emergencies premised on universal Human Rights morality), or as (3) 
collective structural force (class-like organized struggles). In concrete social mobilizations 
several of these meanings may overlap or be transformed by internal tensions and historical 
meanings. But beyond its description of a practice, solidarity does not propose a coherent 
transformative project.  
Solidarity, then, is not an oppositional ideology because it fails to connect to a coherent 
structure for change. The concept becomes a wide umbrella where many different projects 
may find shelter in the agora of their singular struggles, albeit for a short time. Still, the 
dominant meaning of solidarity in Western liberal democracies highlights individual 
autonomy and free will, which result in the emergent power of aggregate concrete projects. 
Neoliberal “globalization” stresses the force of an interconnected world that appears as the 
unified material expression of free-trade and of the benefits of the wide-world market 
discovery of universal tacit knowledge. Instead, as we have underlined above, counter-
hegemonic models rather than presenting a unified theory appear, unbeknownst, as an 
epistemological mirror of the Austrian school model where tacit knowledge is unveiled 
through exchange. Fundamentally, the unintentional and well-meaning extension to activist 
practice of a theoretical framing that adopts the form of the neoliberal market, i.e. an 
emergent process of discovery of what are to be considered as “goods” for the majority of 
people poses, I suggest, a serious political problem.  
In his critique of Marxist political ideology, Lazaratto has pointed out that Marxism rests 
on an understanding of a wider totality where processes are connected to form a structure 





of a “project”, a stable alternative structure to aim at, creating the conditions of possibility 
for the transformation of the world in an oriented manner. On the contrary, the proposed 
“politics of the possible” rest on a perpetual assemblage of “exterior” relations (meaning 
not tied to a totality that structures sense), creating and enacting possible worlds. 
Singularity, multiplicity and the contingent creativity of the event that enables the 
emergence of “the possible” become the new tools for political mobilization (Lazaratto, 
2006). This new (post-structuralist) epistemology explicitly eschews any model as a 
possible guide to political action and transformation. It opposes the idea that the world is a 
structured and meaningful articulation of connected ongoing relationships that can be 
stabilized through analysis and in theory, as a premise for acting upon it. Indeed the world 
may become structured only as a result of our will to make it comprehensible and 
malleable, so that we (humans) may act on in a particular way. How we give it form 
(structure) through practice and discourse both depends on, and defines how we can interact 
with it, and try to change it.  
The problem of structure is, then, political. How to yield power and to what end. The 
possibility of defining a project as a pre-conception that designs a different structure (of 
connecting relationships) is alien to the new “philosophy of the event”, which we have 
described above. Therefore, the meaning of politics can only emerge from the contingent 
connections that create possible worlds and simultaneously enact them. In this approach, 
political innovation and creativity emerge in a similar way to the Austrian school’s 
conception in which the market –an arena of multitude singular events—helps unveil the 





suggest, expresses an epistemological and political ideology that mirrors the phenomenal 
form of capitalist relations. For the Austrian school, interference from a structured (i.e. 
planned) economic project (e.g. a social state project, cf. the socialist side of the socialist 
calculation debate) is anathema to the permanent discovery that the market enables. 
Likewise, interference from a political project (e.g. a conceived design of differently 
structured relationships) is anathema to the new politics of emergence. See for example the 
following quote: “The extraordinary energy of attraction and aggregation revealed by the 
WSF10 resides precisely in refusing the idea of a general theory. The diversity that finds a 
haven in it is free from the fear of being cannibalised by false universalisms or false single 
strategies propounded by any general theory. The time we live in, whose recent past was 
dominated by the idea of a general theory, is perhaps a time of transition that may be 
defined in the following way: we have no need of a general theory, but still need a general 
theory on the impossibility of a general theory.” (Santos 2003b: 341, my emphasis) 
Conclusion: Waging the ideological war. 
Maybe I am pushing the analogy too far here. However, I suggest that this similarity in 
form is an expression of the consolidation of the neoliberal hegemony. Indeed it points to 
the difficulty of daring to conceive of and propose a coherent project of a different world 
that would provide tools to end the destruction, dispossession and devaluation of life that 
affects the great majority of people all over the world (as opposed to creating a mirage of 
myriad possible worlds waging partial and concrete struggles). Capitalism is a modern 
totalitarian reality that presents itself as the highest expression of individual freedom. The 





unconnected wills in the market supports, in fact, a coherent and totalitarian project based 
on relations of depredation, dispossession and exploitation, sustained by regulated privilege 
and geared to capital and power accumulation in the hands of a few (humans).  
Therefore a counter hegemonic force can only be created from a different formal 
framework, one that does not rest on the Austrian market model of creative discovery. I 
think we still need a unitary structure that can break down the hegemony of form that limits 
our present day struggles. We need an integrated theory that connects concrete, singular, 
struggles to a whole and might provide a structured understanding of the world we live in. 
While much of radical political economy scholars are repeatedly doing this in their 
analysis, the post-structural model dominates present-day oppositional politics. As I have 
addressed elsewhere (Narotzky, 2014) this results from histories of past betrayals and 
totalitarian enactments of grand theories, which make resentment and caution legitimate. 
We need, however, to overcome a handicap that we don’t own.   
Different knowledges (or singularities) coming from different histories and cultural 
understandings need to be valued equally (equality) in their own terms (difference) but 
especially in terms of their potentiality to produce a structured, coherent, and powerful 
alternative that makes sense in a connected world. We are struggling against an enemy that 
has as its strongest weapon a hegemony that pervades our lives to the core in the West and 
increasingly all over the world. Admittedly, it is possible that the creative imagination of an 
alternative society will come from spaces not yet totally subsumed to capitalism that exist 
everywhere (Williams, 1977). But in order to accomplish durable change this vision needs 





ideology should be able to explain the experiences that most people have in their various 
forms of existence all over the world, and be able to propose an alternative that makes 
sense to the many all over the world. Indeed, in order to rehabilitate ideology as an 
oppositional instrument we need to pay attention to what people are doing and saying, and 
here the “sociology of absences” (Santos, 2003a) and the emphasis on “knowledges 
otherwise” (Escobar, 2007) is crucial to overcome the blindness that an hegemonic project 
has created. But we also need the courage to make connections and create logical paths, 
proposing a general theory of how social relations are governed and how they should be 
challenged and transformed.  
I am referring here to what Eric Wolf defined as “structural power”: “Structural power 
shapes the social field of action so as to render some kinds of behavior possible, while 
making others less possible or impossible.” (1990:587) At a level of signification we need 
to produce conceptual order, which will create a different mapping of what “sociologies” 
should be made “absent” (new “sociologies of absence”). We should be willing to draw a 
different selection of what connections count and what forms of knowledge we require in 
order to challenge the present structures of power. This, I suggest, is the ideology that we 
are at present unable to produce. At present, the only integrated alternative “oppositional” 
ideologies are being mostly provided by religions and nationalisms. 
Ramon and Juan say they repudiate “ideology” as an instrument of struggle for “tactical” 
reasons. Left ideologies as entrenched in the discourses of governing parties (social-
democratic parties) and classic trade unions are useless because they do not express the 





recurrently subverted and discredited by the actions of those who achieved power under 
that banner. On the other hand, the injured masses have changed and their real lives have 
subverted the classical Left labor/capital centered model of structural relations. While the 
classic wage relationship (lack of ownership of means of production and hence exploitation 
of labor) is still widely spread in most parts of the world, other forms of dispossession (e.g. 
financial rent extraction), dependency (petty commodity production, bonded labor) and 
abandonment (absolute surplus population) are growing. Therefore the old explanatory 
model does not make sense any longer in the present situation, and the attached 
transformative project has been repeatedly discredited by the parties’ practice. A return to 
the real world is necessary.  
What Ramon and Juan see as a “tactical” move away from old models in order to better 
represent the experiences of the majority needs, however, to be reframed in a coherent 
framework that is able to challenge the logics of capitalism. The ethnographic position of 
listening to the variously injured voices and their practical proposals, does not exempt us 
from the responsibility to propose a different overall model of a better society and to 
believe that, at a particular historical conjuncture, the dominant model needs to be 
challenged by a unified force. This can only be achieved by the construction of a theory 
that relates the parts to a whole in a way that makes sense to the many and is capable of 
confronting the model of reality that is deeply entrenched in a hegemonic (Austrian market) 
form.  To propose the need of such an integrated theory and its political expression as an 
oppositional ideology does not imply considering all struggles homogeneous; this would be 





that the theory or its constitutive elements (concepts, logical connections, analyses) will not 
be challenged; as the world changes they will and should be permanently put into question. 
But this is a war, and we need a powerful weapon that can match the neoliberal hegemony 
of form. 
In the non-secular realms many models exist that directly (often violently) struggle for 
hegemony in different parts of the world. It is the secular realm (historically a product of 
the Enlightenment, and hence of the same liberal movement that supported the expansion of 
capitalism and socialism) that seems to be unable to produce an emancipatory model that 
subverts the neoliberal hegemony entrenched after the failure of the socialist experiments. 
Some models are incipient. One is the illiberal model of a hierarchical status society (an 
organic solidarity of the corporatist kind), which harmonizes difference by taming privilege 
through patronage and creating strong exclusionary borders and discarded people at the 
margins. This struggle to push oneself into the space of recognition by cultivating 
patronage networks (Ferguson, 2013) or by recurrently banning access to other claimants 
(Kalb, 2011; Holmes 2000) is very different from the one seeking to destroy enclosures on 
the basis that “another world is possible”. In the latter category, the World Social Forum 
(WSF) model, which extends the liberal form to the struggles against capitalism, declines to 
produce a unified social project and supports a fragmented, partial and often inconsistent 
confrontation with the totalitarian forces of capital, a problem that is recognized by one of 
its more lucid advocates: “The other characteristic of transnational sub-politics, a negative 
one, is that, so far, theories of separation have prevailed over theories of union among the 





A model such as that of the WSF is commendable because it refuses to institute a dominant 
form of knowledge and the unique authority of a universal social model (Santos, 2003b: 
341) in the face of a hegemonic model that normalizes oppression and exploitation. 
However, its strength is also its weakness. Instead, I propose that in order to transform the 
dominant political economic structure in such a way that capitalist forms of accumulation 
are destroyed and substituted by a human economy (Hart et al., 2010), it is necessary to 
have the courage of an oppositional ideology that can become a counter-hegemony 
benefiting the many. 
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1 “In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the 
material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined 
with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or 
philosophic -- in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict 
and fight it out.” (Marx 1859).  
2 “…it must be stressed that the political development of the concept of hegemony 
represents a great philosophical advance as well as a politico-practical one. For it 
necessarily supposes an intellectual unity and an ethic in conformity with a conception of 
reality that has gone beyond common sense and has become, if only within narrow limits, a 
critical conception.” (Gramsci 1987:333-4) 
3 The post-structuralist, ANT and ontological turns in anthropology have contributed a 





                                                                                                                                                    
non-modernist forms of knowledge that have been silenced, (2) the complexity of subject 
status and (3) its post-human and changing being. I do not want to enter this theoretical 
debate.  
4 This perspective is completely different from the neoclassical one (in any of its forms) 
where knowledge is always already there and the problem is how to harmonize it through 
the operation of market interaction (e.g. the process of accessing information will create 
transactions costs, but information is presumed to pre-exist market interaction). 
5 I will not develop this analysis further, as it has been very clearly presented by others 
(Elson, 1988; Adaman & Devine, 1997) 
6 Julia Elyachar (2012) has addressed the debate critically using her ethnographic material 
7 The fact that this is an hegemony means that those enacting it are presumably not aware 
of it. 
8 The distinction between different “worlds” and different “world-views” is critical to the 
ontological turn in anthropology. 
9 I use dependency to connote the power relations that are generally present in most human 
forms of cooperation and support. Inter-dependency refers instead to a relationship not 
infused with power based on sustained equality. 
10 World Social Forum 
